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In-Secure Identities: on the Securitization of Abnormality 
Merav Amir* and Hagar Kotef† 
This paper offers a local analysis of one commonly used airport security technology: full-body 
scanners. To follow on Mark Salter’s claim that “airports have long been laboratories for new 
strategies of both technological and social control” (Salter, 2008b, p. xi), the scanner here is a 
small theoretical experiment in thinking about state security—or perhaps a quite concrete case 
study thereof. In a Foucauldian terminology, the scanner serves here as an anecdote1 
demonstrating a certain change, a tendency, in the configuration of sorting bodies and the 
violence this configuration entails.  
The change we want to identify does not pertain to any and all forms of state security. The 
scanner serves here as an example for scenarios wherein security forces are configured to 
deliberately relinquish discriminatory presuppositions and establish objective measurements 
for identifying threats. We ask: what happens when security schemes are configured to operate 
objectively? Who emerges as the potential enemy, as the carrier of the threat, when security is 
configured to treat all equally? Based on reports by government agencies, accounts by civil 
rights organizations, media reporting and interviews, as well as a critical examination of the 
technology itself, our analysis aims to substantiate the following observations: (i) in their 
attempt to rely on objective measures, such security protocols have integrated the notion of a 
statistically-calculated normality into the realm of security sorting. (ii) While “normal” in this 
context supposedly represents the mere prevalence of a given phenomenon, these systems end 
up reproducing categories which are very much aligned with social norms. (iii) As a result, 
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people whose bodies and behaviours deviate from measured standards of normality, and who 
fall into categories of social abnormality (such as the mentally and physically disabled or 
gender non-conforming individuals), reemerge in such settings as suspected terrorists. Prior 
research has identified these tendencies and has provided compelling analyses of the effects of 
these changes on those caught-up in these new security technologies (for such analyses see: 
Currah & Mulqueen, 2011; Samuels, 2016; Shepherd & Sjoberg, 2012). Our research diverges 
from this line of enquiry by shifting its departure point from identity categories to the 
technological apparatus itself. It provides an examination of the logic subtending these security 
systems, its development within arrays of conflicting motivations and constraints, and 
examines its conditions of possibility. In so doing, we aim to explain, first, why social 
categories of abnormality become so prone to being reconfigured as potential risks and second, 
how this configuration differs from a long history of identifying the abnormal with the 
suspicious.   
To give a sense of what is at stake, let us begin by alluding to the broader circumstances through 
a deliberately-eclectic set of examples. In Canada, the Identity Screening Regulations Act 
states that “An air carrier shall not transport a passenger if (c) the passenger does not appear to 
be of the gender indicated on the identification he or she presents” (Justice Laws Website, 
2011). In an attempt to issue clear guidelines, this regulation does not recognize that for 
transgender individuals, such discrepancies result from the incompatibility of bureaucratic 
systems to people’s lived realities (Spade, 2011) but sees them as attesting to efforts to forge 
documents, to conceal identities, and to lie (Beauchamp, 2009). Consequently, gender non-
conformity, a category that was traditionally pathologized, which appeared as an abnormality 
to be corrected within a binary system of sex/gender, re-emerges in this context as an indicator 
for a potential security hazard. Or, to take an altogether different geo-political context and 
another type of “abnormality:” searching for suspicious behaviours, visual surveillance 
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systems in train stations are not preprogrammed to look for particular triggers. Instead, they 
track types of movements of passengers on platforms to establish what “normal” patterns of 
behavior consist of (e.g. time spent on platform, speed and direction of movement). Having 
established the normal baseline, these systems then trigger alerts when identifying people who 
do not abide by it. The rationale is that people who do not behave “normally” on the platform 
may not be regular passengers but people who may pose a security threat. According to security 
experts who have developed several such systems (A.G., 2013), these algorithms frequently 
identify people who consider committing suicide on the rail, homeless people and beggars as 
potential threats. Hence, a security system, which works to minimize security risks by relying 
on non-discriminatory algorithms, identifies as a threat persons who do not comply with 
assumptions concerning normative (that is, productive) ways of life. Or yet another context, 
and another form of deviating from presubscribed norms: in the Palestinian West Bank, 
mentally disabled Palestinians are repeatedly shot by Israeli soldiers despite posing no threat.2 
To be clear, the violence which the Israeli security forces exercise in the occupied Palestinian 
territory is anything but “non-discriminatory” as it rests on a clear differentiation between 
Palestinians (who are “legitimate” targets and are all seen as potential terrorists), and Jews or 
other non-Arabs (who are the people this violence seeks to protect). Nevertheless, the 
Palestinian population, is generally and uniformly treated as potential terrorists (Ghanim, 
2008). In this context mentally disabled Palestinians are disproportionally shot because, when 
encountering Israeli soldiers they may shout unexpectedly, run away when ordered to stop, do 
not obey soldiers’ commands and move erratically when expected to stand still. They are 
therefore wrongly identified as posing a risk to the soldiers and are treated accordingly.  That 
is, the mentally disabled in the West Bank are shot because of their mental disability, because 
they cannot abide by expected norms of behaviour.   
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Despite the radical differences between them, taken together, these cases demonstrate our 
claim: In civic spaces in which security apparatuses are thickly deployed, certain categories 
that were traditionally addressed through the disciplinary discourse of abnormality are found 
to reappear within a matrix of risks and threats. This should not simply be understood as 
anecdotal or incidental. It demarcates, we claim, a re-shaping of the manifestations and 
rationalizations of particular forms of state violence. This process therefore goes beyond a 
change in the level or type of violence to which people associated with such categories are 
subjected (that is: it is not merely to argue that people who are in various ways marked as 
abnormal are subjected to more, or to other types of violence). Rather, the entire social attitude 
towards abnormality changes here: no longer primarily the target of examination and 
assessment, correction and improvement, abnormality becomes the object of isolation, delay 
and in some cases also elimination. We label this process the securitization of abnormalities.3   
Our analysis will unfold this argument in more detail through looking at the case of the full-
body scanners. Yet this particular test-case means we have another argument, which is a more 
specific intervention in the literature concerning new security technologies. The accelerated 
pace of introducing technological innovations in the field of security leads research to focus, 
many times, on how technology itself reshapes modes of governmentality, the configuring of 
subjects, the flows and distribution of bodies, and the execution of violence (Amoore, 2009; 
Aradau et al., 2008; Leese, 2014).  For us, however, the technology we examine mostly serves 
as a test case representing a broader phenomenon. Placing our argument within a larger 
framework that includes policing, military operations, and border control regulations, we aim 
to demonstrate that the securitization of abnormality must be considered beyond technological 
implementations.  At stake for us, therefore, is a wider claim, concerning a rationale of state 
violence that rests on objective non-discriminatory measures to justify itself. 
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We begin with some short clarifications relating to the scope of our argument and its position 
in relation to existing literature in the field of critical security studies. We continue, in the 
following section with a brief review of the historical circumstances in which the tension 
between prejudice and objectivity shaped security sorting, and specifically, the evolving 
introduction of the full-body scanners into airport security. In the third section we focus on the 
classification of bodies of gender non-conforming persons as a threat by the full-body scanners. 
We argue that in this case, this securitization of abnormalities is a paradoxical and unexpected, 
yet an indicative and perhaps also a logical by-product of the attempt to base security schemes 
on objective and regularized procedures that sift out prejudices and biases from the practices 
of such systems. The fourth section further explores the notion of securitized abnormality by 
situating it in relation to other historical contexts in which abnormality appears as a threat or 
risk. The final section of this paper provides a more systematic conceptual and theoretical 
analysis of the notion of normality via an engagement with the work of Foucault.  
 
1. Demarcating the Terms: Security 
Examining the screening methods used by security agencies, security professionals make a 
distinction between risk-based security screening and screening which assumes uniform risk 
(Elias, 2014). The first, risk-based security, is centered on the assumption that risk is not evenly 
distributed throughout society, and that some categories of persons carry more risks than 
others.4 Risk-based security thus seeks to economize efforts of security providers by identifying 
indicators that distinguish these categories from others in a process which is often called 
“profiling”. In its cruder forms, profiling is organized along social classifications and 
categorizations, such as class, race, or citizenship status (also known as “racial profiling”); 
other, more intricate forms of profiling, rely on identifying patterns of behavior through 
surveillance, data mining or on-site observation (DHS, 2014). Both types of profiling are 
6 
 
notoriously controversial: While profiling along social classifications is highly prone to 
discriminatory practices (if not being discriminatory as such), the reliance of behavioral 
profiling on personal data is primarily dependent on intrusions into people’s privacy. The 
profound social implications of these practices have led most critical analysis of security 
practices—in both public and scholarly arenas—to center on the implementations of these 
types of securitized sorting methods.  
Drawing much less attention is the second type, the uniform risk security, which we encounter 
most often in airports or when entering highly restricted spaces. This type of security rationale 
assumes that everyone is potentially dangerous until proven otherwise (this is why everyone 
has to go through a metal detector before entering a government building or boarding a flight) 
(Elias, 2014). Importantly for us here, the fact that less attention is given by scholarly critique 
to this type of security suggests these critiques accept the claim that this mode of security is 
less discriminatory (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007; Bigo, 2006, 2007; Wilcox, 2015). The full-
body scanner at the focus of this article is predominantly a uniform-risk based technology, and 
our argument should be read as pertaining to this particular field of security.  
This brings us to a second point. Critical examinations that do work on uniform-risk 
technologies do not see them as operating at the level of subject-formation, identity categories, 
or normalization processes. To put it in context: When examining risk-based security, 
particularly that of policing, we see a long history that ties together the targeting, quarantining, 
and restriction of the poor, migrants and others who were marked as morally and/or socially 
improper, with contemporary security technologies that seek to identify, isolate, or eliminate 
those who are deemed a threat (Walters, 2010). As others have shown, this history is 
translatable to an intrinsic rationale of security that is always already entangled in social 
distinctions and classifications (Bigo, 2002; Lyon, 2003; Neocleous, 2008). Accordingly, 
critical analyses of risk-based security often understand them as a form of governmentality 
7 
 
(drawing on a Foucauldian framework), and claim they entail at their heart strong normalizing 
tendencies (cf. Adey, 2009; Amoore, 2009; Salter, 2007). However uniform-risk security is 
often analyzed outside of this history, and the sorting practices uniform-risk security employs 
are perceived, by contrast, as if they were disassociated from the management and regulation 
of collective categorizations. 
In what follows we seek to question this assumption, claiming that even these uniform, 
nondiscriminatory procedures which fragment the body and seemingly take it out of its social 
context, are reliant on normalization processes. These procedures therefore also recreate 
processes of identity formation which are always already entangled in normalization. The 
following section looks at the operation of the full-body scanner to better demonstrate these 
claims. 
 
2. Full-Body Scanners: A Brief History 
Flying through any of the major international airports in the United States or Europe, one has 
grown accustomed to seeing full-body scanners in operation, and has probably had to go 
through them repeatedly herself. With the increasingly invasive airport security rituals 
travellers have to endure, the controversy surrounding the introduction of these scanners was 
soon forgotten, but their integration into the airport security theatre was nothing but trouble-
free. This controversy did not only delay the integration of these scanners into airport security, 
but also reshaped the technology itself.  
Searching for non-metallic objects hidden under people’s clothes, full-body scanners create a 
negative nude image of the body (Image 1). Intensifying, in a sense, what Rachel Hall (2007) 
called ‘the esthetics of transparency’, the equating of visibility with security and concealment 
with threat, these scanners are designed to expose what we are socialized to keep private: the 
body that lays under our clothes. Their introduction to airports therefore stirred fierce public 
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objections, including claims that the scanning is “equivalent to a ‘virtual strip search’”, and 
that the machines show “extraordinary disregard for the privacy rights of air travelers” (EPIC, 
2013). This public outcry managed to push-back security considerations at the time (a rare 
example of such a success indeed), and the plan to put these scanners into use was suspended 
(Hunter, 2009). It was not until Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to blow up Northwest 
Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day of 2009, using plastic explosives he hid in his underwear, 
that the American Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implemented this plan. Other 
agencies internationally soon followed suit (Magnet & Rodgers, 2012). (This was despite 
security agencies' officials addmitting that operational scanners would not have aided in 
detecting Abdulmutallab’s hidden explosives, McCullagh, 2010).  
 Image 1: Image from an active millimeter wave body scanner. Source: 
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/mmw_large.jpg 
 
To ease the public objections to the use of these scanners, various measures aimed at increasing 
privacy were introduced. The first generation of these scanners would display the nude image 
to the security officer operating the machine. Thus, the officer who was also handling the 
passenger could literally see through the clothes of the person standing in front of them. As this 
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procedure was quickly found to be too invasive, the next generation of machines had the image 
projected to a screen in a remote booth, where it was examined by a different operator. This 
operator would then only inform the officers whether the image raised any suspicions (Elias, 
2012). While this solution was perceived as an improvement, it still raised considerable 
concerns and objections as people were not only troubled by the fact that a nude image of their 
body was produced and seen by someone, but that these images can be leaked and circulated 
(as they indeed have in some cases, see: Bosker, 2010). Finally, in 2011, new scanners were 
introduced which seemed to solve these problems, as they included an image-analyzing 
software. Called Automated Target Recognition (ATR), this software performs the analysis of 
the images automatically, and the nude image is neither seen by any person, nor is it 
permanently stored anywhere (DHS, 2011; Elias, 2012). The scanners’ only output is an 
abstracted human figure, on which the location of suspected regions on the passenger’s body 
are marked (Image 2). Passengers who are flagged by the scanner then go through a pat-down 
and additional questioning by security personnel.  
 
Image 2: The output generated by L3 ProVision® which includes an ATR system. Source: 
http://www.sds.l-3com.com/advancedimaging/provision-at.htm.  
  
This narration of the evolution of the full-body scanner shows how the public’s concerns 
regarding privacy have shaped this technology. From this perspective, the scanners are seen as 
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a success story in which state-of-the-art technology offers solutions to human concerns and 
limitations (cf. Sutton, 2014). However, there was an additional constraint which was central 
to the shaping of this technology. Joining this junction in which security and privacy meet, was 
the requirement to eliminate discriminatory practices. 
To understand these claims a brief history of the evolution of airport security as it unfolded 
since the early 2000s will be of use. On its inception in December of 2001, the TSA searched 
for tried and tested aviation security solutions. As part of this process, it turned to Israeli 
security specialists. The Israeli aviation security, which was perceived as an unprecedented 
success in battling terror threats, exposed that its mode of operation was very much reliant on 
racial profiling (targeting all Muslim and Arab passengers) (Hasisi et al., 2012; Pfeffer, 2016). 
While the TSA was happy to adopt this approach (Baker, 2002), it soon learned that liberal 
democracies posed particular legal challenges to an officially inscribed policy which is overtly 
based on racial profiling (Gross & Livingston, 2002). After repeatedly being challenged on this 
issue in the courts and by public representatives, the TSA had to publically denounce its use of 
such methods. John Pistole, the head TSA Administrator at the time, renounced racial profiling 
in front of the House Committee on Homeland Security in 2013, calling it “unlawful”, and 
insisted that such practices are “not tolerated by TSA” (Pistole, 2013).  
While not completely abandoning profiling methods, the public pressure has pushed the TSA 
to increasingly rely on uniform risk security practices. Within this framework, uniform-risk 
security procedures were argued to be, beyond merely “nondiscriminatory”, a solution for 
discrimination. The technology of the full-body scanner thus appeared as a primary solution. 
Abiding by what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison called “mechanical objectivity” (1992), 
reverting to this technology also reinforces the presumption that their operation is necessarily 
impartial. Indeed, Michael Chertoff, who was the US Secretary for Homeland Security between 
2005 and 2008, declared that the implementation of technologies such as full-body scanners 
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“allows us to move beyond crude profiling based on prejudice” (quoted in Amoore & Hall, 
2009, p. 453). In line with such claims, the scanners are advertise by their manufacturers as 
eliminating discrimination, since they do not register pigment density or racial characteristics 
and are thus “color blind” (Saletan, 2007).   
But once the ATR algorithms were integrated into the full-body scanners, it very quickly 
became clear that particular groups of people were being singled out. Gender non-conforming 
individuals such as butch women and trans persons, black women with particular hair styles 
(such as “sisterlocks”), people wearing particular religious groves (such as dastaar (Sikh 
turbans)) or passengers carrying medical appliances on their bodies (such as people with a 
stoma), found that they became regularly subjected to invasive pats and questioning, and 
exposed to extended security probing.5 Paradoxically, the attempts to ensure objectivity are 
precisely what produced such modes of discrimination; not because the claims for objectivity 
are merely a lie (that is, yet another way to bring in racial profiling and other forms of 
discrimination through the back door), but because discrimination is engrained into the way in 
which objectivity is produced. The case of gender non-conforming persons is indicative here, 
and will thus stand at the focus of the next section. 
 
3. Securitizing Abnormality 
To understand why and how transgender persons find themselves targeted by security 
procedures such as the full-body scanner, let us look at its operation. As all scanners of its kind, 
the full-body scanner is designed to identify concealed weaponry and contraband objects under 
people’s clothes. Using millimeter waves, the full-body scanner produces an image of the 
scanned entity, which is then analyzed by the ATR algorithm. As an executive of L-3, the 
company producing these scanners has stated, the algorithm is designed to detect “objects that 
are not supposed to be there” (in Grabell & Salewski, 2011). Yet unlike other scanners, such 
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as those using X-ray, which are designed to detect differences in the types of materials being 
scanned based on their relative penetrability, millimeter waves penetrate through the thin layer 
of clothes but cannot see through objects and body tissue. Consequently, most objects and body 
parts may appear indistinguishable in the outputted image (Image 1). The analysis of the image 
cannot rely on the attributes of the different examined elements (such as color, brightness or 
sharpness of contours), in order to tell body and object apart. To make the distinction between 
what is and is not “supposed to be there” it is therefore mostly dependent on an examination of 
the shape of the reproduced figure. Thus, the ATR algorithm needs to rely on an understanding 
of what the body looks like, and what are its “parts,” or in other words, on certain predetermined 
definitions of the human body as a base-line. Since human bodies come in different shapes and 
forms, these definitions cannot be predefined by the designers of the algorithm, and are 
therefore measured extrapolations that are determined in accordance with aggregated data from 
which statistically-calculated configurations (i.e., “norms”) are defined (Valkenburg & van der 
Ploeg, 2015, p. 328). Passengers’ bodies are then compared to these normalized configurations 
of the human body. Indeed, when the ATR algorithm was first integrated into full-body 
scanners use by the TSA, the agency stated that it is designed to detect “anomalies” on the 
bodies of passengers (DHS, 2011). 
Importantly, when aiming to identify “objects” that are separated from the human figure (that 
is, trying to distinguish between what “should” or “should not” be “there”) the algorithm uses 
one of two possible extrapolated figures of a body, as it analyzes “the anatomy of men and 
women differently” (TSA, 2017). To feed this information into the algorithm, the security agent 
operating the scanner has to push a button indicating the sex of the scanned person, and 
misrecognizing one’s gender results in an alert: the breasts of a female who was wrongly 
identified as male, or the testicles of a trans-woman, for instance, trigger an alert as if they were 
concealing suspicious “objects” under their clothes (Currah & Mulqueen, 2011). Additionally, 
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binding items, breast forms or other prosthetics regularly used by trans people, often appear as 
suspicious objects on such systems. Therefore, having to go through full-body scanners have 
become a major concern for trans and gender-queer persons. Despite, evidently, not being 
designed for this purpose, these scanners do, in fact, reproduce the distinction between 
"properly" gendered bodies and those who do not comply with gender norms, and should hence 
be understood as a form of policing non-normative gendered individuals. (Currah & Mulqueen, 
2011; Magnet & Mason, 2014). As Prior research has already demonstrated, these procedures 
significantly affect the distribution of trans bodies in space, limit people’s mobility, or change 
their gender expression in such settings. Many avoid air travel as much as possible; others 
report being compelled to amend their gender performance to pass as compliant with their 
assigned gender, in order to avoid harassment (avoiding binders, prosthetics, or makeup, 
changing hairstyle, and accommodating body language) (Ring, 2016).    
Yet, there is more than an unintended policing of gender norms here. The mounting evidence 
that people whose gender performance and bodies do not comply with cisnormative (Bauer et 
al., 2009) assumptions were increasingly being targeted has caused civil rights organizations 
and advocacy groups to call on the TSA to revise its scanning procedures. Such groups 
highlighted the fact that this singling out did not only impede the rights of already compromised 
groups of people, and exposed them to harassments and abuse (Grant et al., 2011), but also 
“erode the dignity and privacy of vulnerable travelers” (HRC staff, 2016). Sensitive to public 
criticism, the TSA had responded in December of 2015 by stating that in line with new 
directives “TSA officers may no longer use the term ‘anomaly.’” The actual scanning 
procedures did not change and there were no revisions to the algorithm itself, but the term 
“anomaly” was replaced with “alarm” (Ennis, 2015). While this response was criticized by 
many, claiming that a semantic replacement does nothing to address the actual harm caused by 
security procedures (Margolin, 2015), the TSA insisted the difference is crucial: once a certain 
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anatomy “warrant[s] further inspection,” according to their statement, “TSA officers are trained 
to clear the alarm, not the individual” (TSA, 2017).  
This change in the use of language attempted to address the concerns raised by transgender 
people and the advocacy organizations through a double endeavor. First, it prohibits the use of 
a term that carries a judgement value (anomaly) and then—and thereby—it aims to distance the 
suspected findings from the identity of the passenger. Unlike “anomaly,” which may reflect on 
the person being checked, “alarm” supposedly distinguishes between the “object” which is the 
cause of the concern and the passenger’s actual “body”. Donna Haraway has already pointed 
our attention to the fantasy of separating bodies from objects as a fabricated ideology, by 
demonstrating that all bodies are already integrated into, dependent on, and gain their 
illegibility through various objects (Haraway, 1991). As this separation between body and 
object is doomed to fail, the (queer) body becomes fully and thoroughly securitized: the 
composition of the non-normative body itself becomes an “alarm.” This is the ultimate meaning 
of securitizing abnormality. The securitization of the genderly queer we identify here is 
therefore a particular outcome of an algorithm that concurrently rests on these two assumptions: 
that male and female bodies are neatly distinguishable (TSA, 2017), and that bodies and objects 
are mutually exclusive. Yet the queer body here is but an emblem for bodies as such. 
Theoretically, the securitization of gender non-conforming bodies could be addressed. 
However, the combination of the reliance of the threat-identifying algorithm on the apparatus 
of (a statistically calculated) normality, alongside the principle impossibility to dissociate 
bodies and objects, means that these algorithms are deemed to identify and/or produce 
abnormal corporealities, even if alongside different grids, since in such systems without 
“abnormalities” the concept of “threat” loses its meaning.    
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4. Demarcating the Terms II: Abnormality 
For those of us who are versed in the convoluted history of how queers were treated by the 
state, this may sound as all too familiar since it seems to echo a long history of demarcating 
sexual and gender minorities as posing security threats. In the United States during the 1950’s, 
for instance, when being gay was heavily stigmatized, several thousand gay men and lesbians 
were fired en masse from jobs which required having a federal security clearance. The 
deviation of gays and lesbians from the dictations of the heteronormative society is what 
rendered them as presumed security threats. Being perceived as queer, they were seen as 
belonging to a dangerous subculture, a shady habitus which lured the young, the feeble minded, 
and the psychologically unstable to weaken American society by undermining family 
formation and nurturing moral decay (Johnson, 2004). Similar such histories can be found in 
most liberal countries, including Canada (Robinson & Kimmel, 1994), the United Kingdom 
(Davis, 1971), Western Europe (Psonak, 2000), Australia and New Zealand (Knapp, 2008).  
At some level, then, the fact that trans persons are stopped at the airport by security officers for 
additional screenings and questioning can be seen as a technologically-advanced manifestation 
of this history. Once again, being queer denotes you as suspicious. However, if we examine 
the particular logic and grammar of securitized deviation in the case of the scanner, we will 
find a change, if not a complete reversal. In these past examples, the intersection of security 
and assumptions regarding normality rested on a thick social grid within which deviation 
appears as such. The determination that gays are unfit for public service due to security 
considerations was precedent by, and dependent upon their marking as a distinct category of 
social deviance. While the security categorization did reshape the social signification of these 
identities, it was still a secondary process. Differently put, for the homosexuals in the Cold War 
the security consideration was but a derivative of the frameworks of sexual normalization that 
pushed homosexuals to the social margins, rendering them presumably more vulnerable to 
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being blackmailed, for example. Thus, whilst it undoubtedly reproduced prejudices within a 
different field (considerations concerning espionage rather than concerning the propriety of 
one’s character and behavior), the language and concepts remained the same, merely 
momentarily borrowed to another field (security rather than sexuality) without losing their 
foot—even rooting—in the discourse of sexuality.  
In the case of the scanner, however, the social grid that is the hinge for the securitization of 
gayness above is sidestepped, overridden perhaps, and the screening procedure changes both 
the meaning of “norm” and the apparatuses from which the norm draws its meaning. The sexual 
orientation or gender identity is no longer explicitly seen as a problem, and the answer 
(‘treatment’) no longer takes place in the domain of gender and sexuality. Instead of social 
vulnerability or assumptions regarding emotional instability that is supposedly tied to sexual 
orientation (as in the case of the cold war), transgender persons are singled out by security 
systems since they present a very different kind of abnormality. They are marked as a threat 
since their bodies do not adhere to the expectations of their perceived gender (such as the case 
with the full-body scanners) or the mere fact that there is a discrepancy in their documents (as 
in the case of the Canadian Border Crossing regulations). 
Seemingly, these measures have nothing to do with conservative preconceptions regarding the 
stability and permanence of gender identities, but are aimed at identifying potential terrorists 
and undocumented migrants (categories which are increasingly fused, (Bigo, 2002). All 
judgments concerning gender abnormality are irrelevant in such cases, as they are replaced by 
the seemingly objective question of the compatibility of documents to appearance or of bodies 
to normalized gendered models. However, the reliance on such seemingly objective criteria 
means that gender non-conformity has become a cause for suspicion. Importantly, then, what 
may seem to be a marginal effect of a technology that seeks to isolate security threats concealed 
under people’s clothes, yet accidently captures also “other” people (all those who do not 
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conform to the sex/gender binary order, or whose bodies depend on “objects” to function) is 
an essential and direct outcome of these systems’ very logic of operation.  
 A very similar claim can be made when examining the category of race and how profiling-like 
methods reappear in the workings of the scanner. Black women have repeatedly complained 
that full-body scanners identify them as concealing objects in their hair, and that they are 
consequently subjected to a thorough examination by security personnel (Peterson, 2015). 
Whereas again, it is black (women) rather than white (men or women) who are identified as a 
threat, the crucial difference from ‘classic’ racial profiling is that here ‘blackness’ appears as a 
potential security issue not due to preconceived racist notions of dangerousness or explicit 
racial biases; racial biases appear ‘automatically’ through configurations of normality 
embedded into these machines. That is, racial biases are reconstructed through these 
technologies since in a society in which race appears as an aberration from ‘whiteness’ 
(Bhabha, 1998) they are inseparable from what is programmed into these machines as a normal 
body, or the normal composition of a hairstyle. What we witness here is therefore at once and 
at the same time a continuation (of securitizing abnormality; of racial “profiling”) and a new 
phenomenon.  In accordance with the paradigm of uniform-risk security, while black women 
are singled out not because they are considered dangerous in any way, but by an algorithm 
which associates aberrations from a particular (white) bodily composition and thus finds their 
hair as ‘abnormal’, The fact remains, however, that they are flagged as a security threat.  
Thus various forms of prejudice are nevertheless central to the operations of these systems, yet 
the nature of prejudice has changed in the process. This prejudice has both a different content 
(it primarily discerns other groups) and a different mode of operation (it is not defined a-priori, 
nor does it exist independently of the operation of these scanners, but appears to be no more 
than a byproduct of the scanners’ reliance on normalizing algorithms.) 
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In this regard we depart from the two most prevalent lines of argument concerning the re-
inscription of race and other social categories into seemingly objective security measures. The 
first sees the objective, statistical, scientific language of security as a lie; an attempt to deceive 
in order to obtain legitimacy. This critique claims that security systems simply enact the old 
racisms, while employing pseudo-scientific language to legitimize their actual reliance on 
racial profiling or other form of prejudice (cf. Handeyside, 2015; Lord, 2013). Yet such modes 
of critique miss the productive elements of the legal and social constraints set on security, 
failing to see the concrete role they play in altering the security practices themselves as well 
as the social operation of identity categories. The second approach regards the resurfacing of 
identity categories within such automated calculations of security threats as no more than a 
technical malfunction that can be fixed given the right adjustments (cf. Lianos & Douglas, 
2000; McCartney, 2014; Weinberger, 2010). Contrary to both approaches, we claim that these 
attempts to purge prejudice from mechanisms of security sorting are neither insincere nor mere 
technical glitches, but an essential component within this logic of security that was nonetheless 
deemed to fail from the onset. 
 
5. What is Normal?  
To an extent, at least, our analysis thus far hinges on an examination of the concept of “normal”. 
Foucault distinguishes between two types of normal (even if this distinction shifts and blurs at 
times). The first is the normal as it appears within disciplinary apparatuses (such as mental 
disability or gender non-conformity). This “normal” functions in relation to a model, a pre-
given standard of propriety, health, mental stability, identity, efficiency or productivity to 
which one should conform: “the normal [person] being precisely that which can conform to 
this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of conforming to the norm.” (Foucault, 
2007, p. 85). The processes of measuring against this module and adopting subjects to it he 
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then calls normation. The second type of normal is that of biopolitics, which is, as Stewart 
Elden (2007, p. 573) observes, “the means by which the group of living beings understood as 
a population is measured in order to be governed.” This second meaning is devoid of 
judgement, and is extrapolated from the calculated measurement of particular characteristics: 
here “normal” marks a certain frequency of a trait and its location on a Gaussian curve, 
presumably reflecting the natural order of things. Accordingly, “it is calculation (calcul)… 
which is the model for these rationalities;” (ibid) rationalities that, in turn, are connected both 
to liberalism and to security (and indeed the two often merge in the 1977-78 lectures). Within 
this domain “normal” is not defined by a pre-given social model—marking a “good” or a 
“should” to which one must conform—but is extrapolated from natural processes; it is derived 
from empirical reality rather than being imposed on it in order to shape it. This, in short, is the 
normalizing technology of security: a calculation of the frequency of a given phenomenon, 
which is inferred from the natural flow of things and living beings, their patterns of movement 
and modes of action.  
The security technologies that are at the focus of this paper are guided by this latter type of 
normalization. Whereas its highly localized nature means this is not a fully-fledged biopolitical 
dispositive,6 it is nevertheless integrated into such mechanisms. More importantly, this 
technology operates after the fashion of biopolitical apparatuses: it operates on the level of 
population, with the same logic of statistical calculation, and in a similar field of circulation 
management. At least as a matter of principle, but largely also as a matter of operation, all that 
the security techniques and technologies do is to single out the statistically infrequent 
suggesting that they may pose a security threat. Yet when we examine these technologies and 
procedures, we see a conflation of the two meanings of “normal” whereby these systems would 
tend to identify as a security threat precisely those who were already marked as abnormal in 
one shape or form by disciplinary apparatuses. Consequently, processes of sorting people 
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which are based on the statistically-calculated empirical “normal” (which is deprived of value-
judgment), collapse into what can be easily identified as a process of normation. Crudely put, 
this means that our analysis demonstrates how in the settings we examine, the distinction 
between these two meanings of “normal” cannot be sustained and they, in fact, fold into each 
other. 
Seemingly, what we have here is yet another case in which bio-politics and disciplinary powers 
can be seen as working in tandem, much like in many other examples given by Foucault and 
Foucauldian literature. The results of tests administered to school children as a disciplinary 
measure are also gathered as statistics on a nation-wide measurement of population 
qualifications; the meticulous management of the patient’s file at the hospital that then becomes 
the objects of population-wide statistics; the regulation of women’s sexuality and bodies is 
closely tied to the management and calculation of population’s size, parameters, and ethnic or 
classed boundaries—all these obey a similar logic of disciplinary and bio-power converging or 
enforcing each other. However, there are three crucial differences that render our case both 
different from such examples and indicative of a broader phenomenon: (i) the mode of 
convergence, (ii) the nature of the converging discourses and (iii) the effect of this convergence 
on the nature of subjectivity. 
Firstly, unlike the examples above, as well as many other cases Foucault analyzes, the   collapse 
of these two meanings into each other does not amount to a conversion between the disciplinary 
and the biopolitical in manners that mutually reinforce both. This conjunction between two 
different configurations of power and two distinct meanings of normalization occurs  despite 
consorted efforts to maintain the distinction between them, and, importantly, it occurs exactly 
in the apparatus of control whose justification, its raison d'etre, is its ability to maintain the 
distinction between these two meanings of “normal”. Thus, this conversion of meanings 
counteracts the fundamental rationale of these same security apparatuses.  
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The second crucial difference relates to the nature, or the realm of the conflating discourses. 
Foucault identifies, not precisely the emergence of, but rather the “reactivation” of 
“normalizing” power with an intersection of psychiatric discourse and the legal system, 
occurring roughly in the 18th century. With this intersection, a new form of “positive” power 
emerges and with it appears what we may call “the modern subject.” The latter is an outcome, 
among other historical coincidences, also of a series of “doublings” generated by the 
intersection of law and psychiatry. Foucault explicitly refers to this doubling as the emergence 
of personality alongside offense (action); of norm alongside prohibition; and of irregularity in 
relation to moral or psychological rules alongside transgression or violation. These doublings 
produce, Foucault argues following Nietzsche (1994), a depth which is the modern subject, as 
they shift the discourse “from action to conduct, from offence to a way of being.” (Foucault, 
2003a, pp. 44, 16 respectively). With this process the law is transformed from a prohibition 
(manifesting sovereign power by its ability to punish, and ultimately kill transgressors) to a 
productive element within a larger system of normalization which sorts individuals to normal 
and deviates (categories that themselves become possible by the above doubling) and 
constantly works to conform the latter—but always also the former—to the model of “normal” 
(Foucault, 1978). The subject, in turn, is no longer situated within the realm of legal 
responsibility, but rather within “a realm of mental abnormality,” as “the legally responsible 
individual is replaced by an element that is the correlate of a technique of normalization” 
(Foucault, 2003a, p. 25). The new power that takes precedent at this moment would be later 
termed by Foucault “disciplinary” and later still, will be situated by him within a wider matrix 
of several normalizing powers (Foucault, 2003b). 
Following many Foucauldian scholars, our analysis carries this Foucauldian paradigm to a 
contemporary setting in which the modalities of power, these plateaus on which the different 
modalities meet, and the effects of power (on both subjects and the manifestations of power) 
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change. Whereas Foucault identifies an intersection of psychiatry and law as the moment that 
both symbolizes (if not encapsulates) and plays a role in the formation of the modern subject, 
we identify a different intersection: an intersection between the discourse of security and the 
law in which, we argue, the psychiatric discourse no longer plays a part. This intersection is 
key for understanding the politico-technological negotiations we have examined above. The 
technological changes in full-body scanners we have outlined in the second section follow the 
contours law dictates. Thus, legal concerns regarding discriminatory practices, as well as the 
safeguarding of personal privacy and the production and the distribution of nude images, 
intervene in reshaping the fashion and means through which security is manifested (Elias, 
2012). In particular, the demand to cleanse security practices of anything resembling 
discrimination is essentially the requisite that security will not operate after the fashion of 
psychiatric discourse, that is, the sorting into distinct groups. Put differently: it is law that molds 
the principal inability of security, in these contexts, to resort to identity-based categorizations 
for the purpose of profiling, and that poses the need to come up with objective and universal 
criteria.  
The exclusion of psychiatry and its modes of action from these particular sites of 
governmentality explains the changes in the securitization of queerness to which we point at 
the end of the previous section: the intersection of law and security does not produce the 
doublings that turn acts into subjects. Here transpires the third difference from more classic 
Foucauldian formulations: the effects of this conjuncture on the nature of subjectivity. This is 
not to argue that there are no subjectivation processes involved. If one follows the Foucauldian 
logic of power as productive rather than merely excluding and restricting, one should seriously 
consider the possibility that such new intersections would give rise to new forms of 
subjectivity. As Mark Salter (2007) clearly demonstrates, these local contexts also yield 
themselves to complex processes of subject formation. Furthermore, In highlighting the 
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interaction between law and technology we do not seek to argue that it has replaced the 
intersection of law and psychiatry or the disciplinary understanding of normalization. Despite 
the increasing prevalence of security-oriented encounters, and despite the radical 
transformations in disciplinary systems (Deleuze, 1997), disciplinary subjectivisation has yet 
to disappear and should be understood as working in tandem with the processes of 
securitization we identify here. 
Yet such processes take a different form in this context. Unlike the systematic and 
comprehensive effort of disciplinary technologies which are embedded throughout social 
institutions to shape the subject thoroughly, pervasively, operating on her deepest levels 
(indeed, technologies which are set to create the subject as a being having a deep core, Foucault, 
1979), security technologies meet the subject sporadically and momentarily – when the scan 
takes place; when the border is crossed. These encounters are not systematized within coherent 
frames aiming at producing a uniformity within identity categories. In these contexts, the 
relevant identity categories are therefore flattened, to an extent, and are displaced onto a 
different social sphere. The outcome is dual: first, with the side-lining of the richer social 
context within which disciplinary technologies are embedded, there is also a shrinking of 
venues for resignification and re-subjectivization that are at the disposal of the bodily queer in 
other contexts. Hence, the earlier “transvestite” and the later “gender identity disorder” or 
“gender dysphoria disorders” were reclaimed through self-assigned identities such as 
transsexual, transgender or the gender-queer. Second and relatedly, rather than a complex 
system of signification and resignification, bodily meanings are organized around the binary 
distinction between the threatening and the benign and corrective treatments are replaced with 
the violent suspicion reserved to the suspected terrorist and other enemies of the state.  
This folding of the two meanings of normal into each other, this failure of the scanners to 
deliver on their stated goals to eradicate the discriminatory practices through producing an 
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impartial gaze, could presumably be explained as a limitation of technological design. Critical 
research of technology has demonstrated that the design and assemblage of technological 
innovations cannot be seen as being void of social preconceptions (Valkenburg & van der 
Ploeg, 2015). Machines are often shaped under implicit assumptions that their users would 
share the same social categories of their designers, and, inter alia, their perception of the 
composition of human bodies. However, the example of the scanner goes beyond 
demonstrating the biases embedded into technologies that reflect the preconceptions and 
prejudices, implicit or otherwise, of their designers (in the example here, through the 
assumption that men and women should be scanned differently). Such biases can presumably 
be minimized by more political awareness and social sensitivities. Yet as the logic of operation 
of the algorithm is designed to identify threat with deviation (from the “normal” body or a 
“normal” human behavior), it is bound to reproduce the securitization of abnormalities in one 
way or form.  
This is since the objectively-calculated normalization would necessarily replicate the 
categories of normation. This assertion rests on the claim that processes of empirical 
(statistical) normalization of the body, measuring human behavior and constitution, are 
irrefutably entangled in the ways in which the body has been disciplined and categorized, 
deciphered and signified. This entanglement, queer theory teaches us, is always already 
immersed in normation processes. Bodies can be sorted, measured, compared and averaged 
only after they have been normalized; only after they have been construed by the categories 
that render bodies intelligible, and are thus the effects of prior disciplinary processes (Butler, 
1993). At least when engaged in the particularities of bodies, then, the second type of 
normalization (that of biopolitics) unavoidably carries with it the first type (of discipline). What 
we have here is a technological manifestation of Butler’s structural claim that the liberal 
paradigm of inclusion can never achieve its promise: there will always be forms of exclusion. 
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Even if such algorithms would be designed under different sets of assumptions concerning the 
structure of gender categories, abnormalities of some kind would necessarily still be produced 
by these technologies and marked as a security problem (be it heart rate, body heat, size, 
mobility or functionality for instance). Thus, people who deviate from some construed 
assumptions regarding what bodies should be constituted of would still be marked as a threat.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we sought to show that the uniform-risk security logic we increasingly encounter 
rests on– and brings about new meanings of ‘normality’, as well as new implications for the 
classifications of identity categories which are marked as ‘deviant’. This is not simply a process 
in which one set of (disciplinary) classifications is superimposed on, or infiltrates into another 
field (that of security), but a productive process in which these distinctions are blurred and fuse 
to produce a new articulation of abnormality. As we discussed, disciplinary power and 
biopower/security often indeed converge and work in tandem within Foucauldian paradigms, 
yet the two meanings of “normal” obtained by these two configurations of power remain 
distinct. Whereas one is a predefined and ethically-loaded model that dictates judgement based 
on one’s ability to conform to it, the other is a purely empirical measurement, extrapolated 
from the order of things; the first creates distinct categories of abnormality in well-defined 
fields, while the second operates in diverse milieus. Our analysis, however, demonstrated a 
process by which the categories of abnormality from the disciplinary field emerge within the 
biopolitical logic.  
As Michael Warner shows us, a critique of power must maintain a distinction between 
disciplinary and bio-political modes of normalization, since a conflation of the two meanings 
often serves to render transparent the operation of social powers. Being normal in terms of 
one’s gendered and sexual identity, for instance, makes little sense from a statistical point of 
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view, neither as an aspiration, nor as a lived reality (Warner, 1999). What we showed here is a 
case in which the two meanings of normal fold into each other, and disciplinary categories 
reemerge simply as statistical aberrations within the biopolitical realm. Importantly, in their 
reemergence these identity categories appear cleansed of the historical, social and cultural 
contexts in which they were construed and in which they gain their meaning. This 
decontextualization depoliticizes such identities, and masks them as value-free and merely-
numeric, yet within a field wherein risk is defined as abnormality. The result is that 
discrimination, state violence, detention, or removal are reinstated as a treatment for aberrant 
identities. The depoliticizing effect of such security apparatuses does not only have theoretical 
implications, but also defines what would constitute effective resistance to such practices of 
exclusion. From our analysis herein we could begin postulating that framing resistance in the 
language of rights or demands for accountability by the relevant state-agencies, or focusing on 
struggles for signification and representation fail to address the core issues that are at stake 
here. While articulating this is evidently beyond the scope for us here, these are the exact 
questions that urgently need to be rethought. 
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Notes 
 
1. For the use of anecdotes in Foucault see Ophir (1989).  
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2. There are no accurate numbers of such incidents. However, the data aggregated by the human 
rights organization B’Tselem, suggests that the chances of a mentally disabled person in the 
oPt to be killed is double that of someone who is not mentally disabled (B'Tselem, 2017).  
3. By the term “securitization” we mean the introduction of a thing (an object, a relation, a 
category etc.) into the realm of security.  
4. For an extensive analysis of the concept of risk see (Beck, 1992). For an extrapolation of 
how it relates to security see (Dillon, 2008; Salter, 2008a). 
5. For a documentation of such reports see (Kaur, 2011; Peterson, 2015; Ring, 2016; UOAA, 
2017) 
6. Moreover, this apparatus deviates from one of the attributes of biopolitics as defined by 
Foucault. Foucault’s biopolitics is a logic of managing risks without pertaining to eliminate 
them and, moreover, by allowing risk to take it natural course. It assumes that the optimization 
of natural tendencies requires the very existence of risks (Foucault, 2007). The logic we 
examine here, however, in its very local articulation, seeks to annul risks altogether.   
